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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Daniel Chemobieff appeals the denial of his motion to suppress the results of a
warrantless blood draw.

Following the magistrate's denial of the motion, Mr. Chemobieff

entered a conditional guilty plea. On appeal, the District court affirmed the Magistrate's denial
of the motion to suppress. Mr. Chemobieff brings this appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. On
appeal, Mr. Chemobieff contends that 1) that the Magistrate's finding of facts were not
supported by substantial and competent evidence, and 2) there were insufficient facts to make the
determination that an exigency excused the requirement for a warrant.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On September 11, 2013, at about 11:00 p.m. Idaho State Police Corporal Matthew Sly
responded to a traffic stop. 1 Upon arrival, he started investigating the driver of the vehicle,
Daniel Chemobieff, for possible driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"). 2 When he
approached the car, Corporal Sly noticed the odor of an alcoholic beverage. 3 He also noted that
Mr. Chemobieffhad glassy and bloodshot eyes. 4 Corporal Sly began to speak with Mr.
Chemobieff and his responses were slow and lethargic. 5 Based upon his experience, Corporal
Sly asked Mr. Chemobieff to perform the standard field sobriety tests. 6 Mr. Chemobieff
declined to take any of the standard field sobriety tests. 7

1
2

Transcript, p. 8, In. 3-7.
Tr., p. 9, In. 3.
3 Tr., p. 10, In. 5-10.
4 Id.
5 Tr., p. 13, In. 9-14.
6 Tr., p. 15, In. 4-8.
7
Tr., p. 15, In. 9-10.
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Based upon Mr. Chemobieff's refusal, Corporal Sly placed him under arrest for suspicion of
DUI and placed him in his patrol car. 8 Once in the car, Corporal Sly played the audio version of
the administrative license suspension to Mr. Chemobieff, and began to count the required fifteen
minute wait period for a breath test. 9 Mr. Chemobieff subsequently declined the breath test. Io
Corporal Sly then contacted the on-call prosecutor in order to begin the process of
obtaining a warrant to draw Mr. Chemobieff's blood. 11 The prosecutor on duty informed
Corporal Sly to transport Mr. Chemobieffback to the jail, and he would set up a conference call
with the on-call magistrate in order to obtain a search warrant. I2 While Corporal Sly and Mr.
Chemobieff were en route to the jail, the prosecutor had been unable to reach the on-call
magistrate. 13 The first attempt for a conference call at the jail was unsuccessful.I 4 The on-call
prosecutor informed Corporal Sly that he would try to contact the on-call magistrate again, and
then call Corporal Sly back in five or ten minutes_ Is In total, the prosecutor attempted to contact
the magistrate three to five times. 16
When the prosecutor called Corporal Sly back, he had still been unable to get in touch
with the magistrate. 17 No warrant was obtained to take Mr. Chemobieff's blood. 18 Since the oncall magistrate could not be reached, the prosecutor authorized Corporal Sly to take Mr.
Chemobieff's blood without a warrant with the default of there being exigent circumstances. 19
There was a five to ten minute delay between the unsuccessful call and the decision to draw Mr.
8

Tr., p. 15, In. 14-22.
Tr., p. 15 In. 23- p.16, In. 1.
10 Tr., p. 16, In. 5-9.
11 Tr., p. 16, In. 21 - p. 17, In. 12.
12 Tr. p. 26, In. 7-12.
13
Tr. p. 26, In. 16-25.
14
Tr. p. 27, In. 3-8.
15 Tr. p. 18, In. 22-24.
16 Tr. p. 27, In 11-12.
17 Tr. p. 19, In 2-5.
18 Tr. p. 19, In 18-20.
19
Tr. p. 19, In 22-24.
9
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°

Chemobieff s blood. 2 Corporal Sly called a phlebotomist to the jail and the phlebotomist
performed a blood draw with no further problems. 21 It was later determined that the on-call
magistrate had turned off the ringer on his cellular phone. 22
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
MAGISTRATE'S FINDINGS OF FACT WAS SUPPORTED BY SUB STANCIAL
AND COMPETANT EVIDENCE.

2. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF
THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE RESULTS OF THE BLOOD DRAW.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a
motion to suppress is challenged, the Court accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are
supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles
to the facts as found. State v. Smith, 355 P.3d 644 (Ct. App. 20l5)(citing State v. Atkinson, 128
Idaho 559,561,916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996)). At a suppression hearing, the power to
assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual
inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993,
997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
ARGUMENT

Drawing a person's blood constitutes a search and requires that the State have a warrant
or a valid exception to the warrant requirement must apply. In particular, a blood draw is a
severely intrusive search of a person's body which brings it under the ambient of the Fourth
Amendment. State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368,370, 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989). Both the Idaho
20
21
22

Tr. p. 18, In. 22-24
Tr. p. 20, In. 3-20.
Tr., p. 27, In. 14-16.
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and United States Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S.
Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const., Art. 1, § 17. Because of this protection, any warrantless search
is presumptively invalid. Woolery, 116 Idaho at 3 70, 755 P.2d at 1212. If a search is conducted
without a warrant, the burden falls on the State to justify why police saw fit to disregard the
citizens Constitutional rights. Id.
The warrant requirement is so central to the Fourth Amendment that warrantless searches
are presumed to be unreasonable. "In a long line of cases, this Court has stressed that searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment

subject only to a few specifically established and

well delineated exceptions." Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19-20, 105 S. Ct. 409, 410-11
(1984) (internal quotation omitted). "The exceptions are jealously and carefully drawn, and there
must be a showing by those who seek exemption ... that the exigencies of the situation made
that course imperative." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2032
(1971) (internal quotation omitted). "In cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably
practicable, it must be used .... " Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156, 45 S. Ct. 280, 286
(1925).
Magistrates serve an important function in our legal system.

"Absent some grave

emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the
police. This was done not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal
activities. It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in
order to enforce the law." McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455, 69 S. Ct. 1623 (1948).
While officers on scene are likely to be hurried, excited and intent on securing an arrest, a neutral
and detached magistrate serves to safeguard the constitutional liberties of the suspect. "[T]he

4

detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, [] is a more reliable safeguard against improper
searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9, 97 S. Ct. 2476,
2484 (1977) (internal quotation omitted) (abrogated on other grounds by California v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565 (1991)). Simply stated, without a magistrate standing guard between police and
citizens, the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningless. Under the exigent circumstances
exception, police may conduct warrantless searches and seizures when the facts available
indicate that an "emergency exists in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant would
threaten the loss or destruction of evidence." United States v. Chapel, 55 F.3d 1416, 1419 (9th
Cir. 1995).
It is therefore incumbent upon the State to justify any warrantless blood draw.
Warrantless blood draws can be justified by the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement. See, e.g., State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1989) (Defendant
involved in multi-car collision resulting in a death and the defendant was taken to the hospital);

State v. Cooper, 136 Idaho 697, 39 P.3d 637 (Ct. App. 2001) (Defendant involved in multi-car
collision resulting in a death and defendant was flown to hospital by helicopter); State v. Curtis,
106 Ida..11.o 483,680 P.2d 1383 (Ct. App. 19·84) (Defendant involved in multi-car collision
resulting in a death and defendant was taken to hospital by ambulance); State v. De Witt, 145
Idaho 709, 184 P.3d 215 (Ct. App. 2008) (Defendant seriously injured in accident and taken to
hospital by ambulance). However, in this case, the law enforcement officer was not faced with
any emergency or other exigent circumstances that would justify this warrantless blood draw.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized only a few well delineated situations in
which the exigent circumstances exception applies. See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S.
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38, 42-43 (1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-299, 87
S. Ct. 1642, 1945 (1967) (same); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771 (1966)
(destruction of evidence); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296, 93 S. Ct. 2000, 2004 (1973)
(same); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S. Ct. 1623 (1963) (same); lvfichigan v. Tyler, 436
U.S. 499, 509, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1950 (1978) (ongoing fire).

"Prior decisions of this Court,

however, have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are few in number and
carefully delineated."

Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984) (internal quotation

omitted). "Police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need" for a
warrantless search under the exigent circumstances exception. Id, 466 U.S. at 749-750. "When
an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, he ought to be in a position to justify it by
pointing to some real immediate and serious consequences if he postponed action to get a
warrant." Id., at 751 (citing McDonald, 335 U.S. at 460, 69 S. Ct. at 199).
The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to delay their investigation if doing so
would endanger the lives of themselves or others. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967);
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006). When officers are faced with a situation where the

delay in obtaining a warrant could result in the destruction of evidence, an exigency may also
exist. Ker, 374 U.S. at 40-41; Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). When determining whether
there is a risk of destruction of evidence sufficient to excuse a warrant, courts also consider the
seriousness of the offense. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 751. Just because evidence will be destroyed in a
particular case does not necessarily mean that an exigent circumstances exception applies. See,
e.g., Johnson, 333 U.S. 10 (warrantless search not appropriate simply because opium fumes were

dissipating); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S. Ct. 776 (1961) (warrantless search
not appropriate simply because whiskey mash smell may dissipate); Welsh, 466 U.S. 740
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(warrantless seizure of defendant not appropriate simply because blood alcohol level was
dissipating).
Idaho Courts have also recognized that "[t]he exigent circumstances exception allows
agents of the State to conduct a warrantless search when there is a 'compelling need for official
action and no time to secure a warrant."' State v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470, 472, 65 P. 3d
211, 213 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509).

"The exigent circumstances

exception does not apply where there is time to secure a warrant." State v. Robinson, 144 Idaho
496, 501, 163 P. 3d 1208, 1213 (Ct. App. 2007).
This exception does not serve to streamline police procedures or investigations. "The
mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard
of the Fourth Amendment." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (1978).
"The investigation of crime would always be simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the
Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those who ,:vrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a
person's home and property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in
enforcement of the criminal law." Id.
In some situations, drawing an individual's blood may fall into the category of being

considered exigent circumstances. The Supreme Court recognized that a warrantless blood draw
could fall under the exigent circumstances exception in Schmerber v. California. In Schmerber,
the defendant was involved in a serious car accident that required his hospitalization and a police
investigation of the crash. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 771. The Court engaged in an
exigent circumstances analysis and concluded that "[g]iven these special facts", this warrantless
blood draw falls within the exception. Id. The fact the defendant's blood alcohol content
("BAC") BAC was diminishing was only one of the factors the Court considered in reaching its
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conclusion. Also important to the Court's analysis was the fact that the officer had to spend time
to conduct an accident investigation, and the fact that defendant had to be taken to the hospital to
assessed for injuries. Id. Given these two additional delays, coupled with the fact that
defendant's BAC was dropping, the Court found that exigent circumstances existed to negate the
warrant requirement. The Court concluded by stating, "[i]t bears repeating, however, that we
reach this judgment only on the facts of the present record." Id., at 772.
The U.S. Supreme Court recently decided the issue of the constitutionality of warrantless,
involuntary blood draws in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). In

McNeely the Court declared that "in those drunk driving investigations where police officer's can
reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly
undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates they do so." Id. at
1561. Under the exigent circumstances exception, police may conduct warrantless searches and
seizures when the facts available indicate that an "emergency exists in which the delay necessary
to obtain a warrant would threaten the loss or destruction of evidence" or life. United States v.

Chapel, 55 F.3d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1995).

Mr. Chemobieff contends that 1) that the magistrate's finding of facts were not supported
by substantial and competent evidence, and 2) there were insufficient facts to make the
determination that an exigency excused the requirement for a warrant. Therefore, the results of
Mr. Chernbieff' s blood draw should be suppressed.
I.

THE DISTRlCT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE MAGISTRATE'S
FINDINGS OF FACT WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANCIAL AND COMPETANT
EVIDENCE.
The facts used to support the magistrate's denial of the motion to suppress were not

supported by competent and substantial evidence. The magistrate did not make a clear finding

8

that Mr. Chemobieff's delayed the investigation and further, it is unclear. It is also unclear that
the factual basis for denying the motion was actually the factors used by the magistrate in
denying the motion to suppress.
First, the Magistrate did not make a clear finding that Mr. Chemobieff caused any delay
in the process. The District Court stated that the magistrate found that Mr. Chemobieff delayed
the investigation. But, when asked about delay, the magistrate stated, "All I am saying is he
wasn't cooperating .... .It may-may or may not have been a time delay." 23
Also, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that this instance of failure was a onetime event. The District Court determined that the lynch pin of the analysis for the totality of the
circumstances to the exigency exception to the warrant requirement depended on the failure of
the system in place for an on-call magistrate. 24 As noted by the District Court after affirming the
magistrate:
However, and this is a very weighty however, this breakdown have been exposed
and can be addressed by a redundancy system, at least where multiple judges are
available. The logic of the old adage that every dog gets one bite is applicable in
this realm. It is very unlikely that a failure in the judicial process in the future will
not weigh as an exigency unless that failure is tied to a failure of equipment of
some other factor not controllable in the court system itself. 25
In this case, there was nothing in the record to show that this was the first and only time that such
a breakdown of the on-call magistrate system had occurred. If the failure of the system is to be a
factor in evaluating the totality of the circumstances, then it is necessary to know if the same
problem had happened before. Many of the other factors were determined to be common
conditions and not significant in evaluating the totality of the circumstances. 26

23

24
25
26

Tr. pg. 49, In. 49.
Opinion on Appeal, pg. 6.
Opinion on Appeal, pg. 7.
Opinion on Appeal, pg. 6.
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As a result, the findings of fact used by the District Court and the magistrate were not
supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. THereofre, do not support the
denial of Mr. Chernobieff's Motion to Suppress.

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION
TO SUPPRESS THE RESULTS OF THE BLOOD DRAW.
Mr. Chernobieff asserts that the even if the facts found by the magistrate are supported by the

record, the Magistrate did not consider the totality of the circumstances when finding an
exception to the warrant requirement.
First, the magistrate's analysis consisted of the good faith attempts by the prosecutor in
trying to obtain a warrant to draw Mr. Chernobieff's blood. In clarification of his ruling, the
magistrate said that because the prosecutor acted in good faith, a warrant was not required. 27 This
only factor is what the magistrate principally relied upon when denying the motion. Such a
weighty factor is not appropriate. As stated in McNeeley, "to determine whether a law
enforcement officer faced an emergency that justified acting without a warrant, this Court looks
to the totality of the circumstances." McNeeley, at 1559. The McNeeley Court was clear that
there should be no per se exceptions to the warrant requirement.

In this case, the magistrate's ruling creates aper se category for an exigency exception.
The magistrate found that there was a good faith effort by the State to obtain a search warrant
prior to drawing Mr. Chemobieff's blood. 28 The categorical exception in this case would be that
if the system to quickly have a magistrate issue a warrant fails, then the exigent circumstances
would automatically exist and the prosecutor may authorize the officer to draw blood without a
warrant. This categorical approach to alleviating the requirement to obtain a search warrant is

27
28

Tr., p. 48, ln21-24.
Tr. p. 48, In. 21-23.
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exactly the type of categorical exception both McNeeley and State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416,423,
P.3d 575,582 (2014) found to be unconstitutional.
In this case, the exigency was not a situation that the officer encountered and had to make
a quick decision. Instead, the system created to quickly issue warrants caused the exigency.
More specifically, situation's urgency was based on human error of the on call magistrate having
the ringer turned off, rather than a failure of external circumstances. The inability to obtain a
warrant in this case was much different than the situation law enforcement faced in Schemerber.
In Schmerber, the officer concluded that it would have taken too long to obtain a warrant. The
officer suspected that the Defendant was under the influence of alcohol after seeing him in the
hospital nearly two hours after his first encounter with the Defendant. Schmerber, 384 at 769, 86
S. Ct. at 1835. In that case, the Court determined that it was reasonable for the officer to draw
blood where he had already taken the time to bring the defendant to the hospital and investigate
the scene of the accident. Schmerber, 384 at 770-1, 86 S. Ct. at 1836.

There was simply no

time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant.
The McNeeley Court stated that, "technological developments that enable to police
officers to secure warrants more quickly, and do so withoutundermining the neutral role of the
magistrate judge's essential role as a check on the police discretion, are relevaI1t to the
assessment of the exigency." McNeeley, 113 S. Ct. at 1562.
In this case, Corporal Sly testified that there was only a five to ten minute delay between
the lack of response from the magistrate and the prosecutor directing him to take Mr.
Chemobieff's blood. 29 Once the magistrate could not be reached, the prosecutor determined that
there was an exigency. 30 The system in place only required the magistrate to answer the phone in

29
30

Tr. Pg. 18, In. 20-24.
Tr. Pg. 28, In. 2-9.
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order to have the warrant heard. Even ifthere were no back-up magistrates immediately
available, there was no record that there is any danger of evidence destruction. After the
prosecutor determined that there was an exigency, there was another waiting period for the
phlebotomist to show up to the jail to draw the blood. 31 This could have been time used to make
additional attempts to contact the magistrate. There also could have been attempts to contact the
magistrate through alternative methods.
In fact, the prosecutor stated that since they were unable to reach the on call magistrate,
he would "default back to exigent circumstances that would provide an exception to the warrant
requirement due to the unavailability of securing a warrant in a timely fashion." 32 Such a position
is exactly what McNeeley states should not exist with warrantless blood draws: a categorical
"default" position that may be relied upon. Instead, if there were true exigent circumstances,
such a conclusion should be rendered according to the totality of the circumstances, instead of
relying on one per se exception.
The factors listed by the District Court were insufficient to affirm the magistrate's
conclusion as well. As noted above, it was unclear whether or not the magistrate actually found
that Mr. Chemobieff caused any delay in the investigation. 33 There is also no evidence to show
that there was any time delay of the blood draw, other than the five-to-ten minutes that elapsed
while the on call prosecutor attempted to call the magistrate. 34 There is no support for the
conclusion that the inability to reach a magistrate by its on-call system contributes to an
exigency.

31

Tr.
Tr.
33 Tr.
34 Tr.
32

Pg. 19, In. 22 - Pg. 20, In. 10.
p. 28, In. 2-9.
pg. 49, Ln. 15-20.
p. 18, In. 20-24.
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The exception used by the State in this case is an impermissible categorical exception to
warrant requirement. Since the State could not immediately obtain a search warrant, it
defaulted to the exigency exception to the warrant requirement to draw Mr. Chemobieffs blood
where an exigency did not exist. Therefore the result of the warrantless blood draw should be
suppressed.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chemobieff asserts that the magistrate erred in denying his motion to suppress by
failing to apply the correct legal standard. Additionally, Mr. Chemobieff asserts that the District
Court erred in affirming the Magistrate's denial of the motion to suppress. Mr. Chemobieff
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the denial of the Motion to Suppress.
DATED this 9th day of October, 2015.
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